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C ~ n ~ t i t ~ t i ~ n d  Law-SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-ABORTION- 
REASONABLE STATUTORY RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING RE- 
QUIREMENTS UPHELD-Planned Parenthood V. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 
2831 (1976). 
Planned Parenthood, a not-for-profit corporation, and two 
Missouri physicians brought suit in 1974 requesting injunctive 
relief from the operation of a new Missouri abortion statute and 
challenging its constit~tionality.~ The action challenged provi- 
sions, applicable to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, requiring 
a patient's written consent for an abortion, spousal consent for an 
abortion, and parental consent prior to performing an abortion on 
unmarried minors. The action also challenged provisions defining 
viability, requiring the physician to exercise professional care to 
preserve the fetus' life and health, declaring an infant who sur- 
vives an abortion that was not performed to save the mother's life 
or health to be a ward of the state, prohibiting the saline amni- 
ocentesis method of abortion after the first twelve weeks of preg- 
nancy, and prescribing reporting and recordkeeping requirements 
for health facilities and for physicians performing abortions. 
A three-judge federal district court held all the challenged 
provisions valid except the requirement that physicians exercise 
professional care to preserve the life and health of the fetus.' On 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the provi- 
sions requiring spousal and blanket parental consent, prohibiting 
the saline amniocentesis method of abortion, and requiring physi- 
cians to exercise professional care to preserve the fetus were un- 
constitutional. The provisions defining viability, requiring the 
patient's consent, and prescribing reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, however, were ~ p h e l d . ~  The scope of this case note 
will be confined to issues raised by the reporting and recordkeep- 
ing requirements of the Missouri statute. 
The Supreme Court and many of its academic critics agree 
- - 
1. 96 S. Ct. a t  2835. The statute, Mo. ANN. STAT. $ §  188.010-.085 (Vernon Supp. 
1976), was drafted to replace Missouri's previous abortion legislation, which was declared 
unconstitutional in 1973 as a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 96 S. Ct. a t  2835. The suit, naming 
John C. Danforth, Attorney General of Missouri, and the Circuit Attorney of St. Louis as 
defendants, was filed three days after the new law became effective. Id. 
2. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975). 
3. 96 S. Ct. at 2838-48. The Court declined (on grounds of standing) to decide the 
constitutionality of the provision declaring an infant who survives an abortion not per- 
formed to save the mother's life or health a ward of the state. Id. at  2838 n.2. 
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that judicial review of abortion legislation is bottomed on sub- 
stantive due process theory.' This oft denounced theory has un- 
dergone a long and turbulent development, including a period of 
virtual extinction. The standards applied under its rubric have 
experienced a similar h i ~ t o r y . ~  
A. Standards Applied in Substantive Due Process Analysis 
1. The old substantive due process 
The old substantive due process culminated in Lochner u. 
New York,"he infamous symbol of economic due process, which 
propounded a reasonableness standard for determining the valid- 
ity of state legislation: 
[Tlhe question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and 
appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an 
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the 
right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into . . . 
contracts . . . ?' 
In short, Lochner demanded that both the end and the means of 
legislation must affirmatively be shown to be reasonable? 
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), held that the 
right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept 
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to 
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy. 
Id. at 153 (emphasis added), quoted in instant case, 96 S. Ct. a t  2837. Academic support 
for this view can be found in Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Demo- 
cratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 83-85; Ely, The Wages of Crying 
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (denunciation of Roe); Epstein, 
Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 
159 (criticism of Roe); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The 
Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976) (defense of 
Roe and Doe v. Bolton). 
5. See G.  GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548-656 (9th ed. 
1975); Dixon, supra note 4, a t  43; Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emer- 
gence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 A m .  L. REV. 419 (1973). 
6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a detailed history and analysis of the Lochner philosophy, 
see Strong, supra note 5, a t  419. 
7. 198 U.S. a t  56. 
8. The Court also stated: 
The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end 
itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid 
which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person 
and in his power to contract . . . . 
Id. a t  57-58. 
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Although Lochner and most similarly decided subsequent 
cases of its era involved the application of substantive due process 
theory to invalidate legislation regulating the economic sphere,@ 
the Court also made significant use of the theory in reviewing 
noneconomic legislation.1° In this field, too, the Court employed 
a reasonableness standard to adjudicate the constitutionality of 
legislation: "[Rlights guaranteed by the Constitution may not 
be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to 
some purpose within the competency of the State."ll 
The effectual demise of economic due process occurred in the 
l%O's, l2 and the reasonableness standard, although remaining 
essentially unchanged in its verbal configuration, deteriorated 
into a "minimum rationality" test that involved no meaningful 
scrutiny of legislation affecting economic rights.13 Minimum ra- 
tionality, also known as the rational relation or rational basis test, 
began with the premise that "the law need not be in every respect 
logically consistent with its aims to be con~titutional."~~ This 
test, therefore, required merely that "there [be] an evil a t  hand 
for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it? In keeping 
with this spirit of judicial laissez faire, the Court, after Nebbia 
v. New York16 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,17 invariably 
- --- 
9. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Adkins v. Children's 
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 
208 U.S. 161 (1908). During the period from 1905 to the mid-1930's, nearly 200 economic 
regulations were ruled unconstitutional, but a larger number withstood constitutional 
attack. G. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 564-65. 
10. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court held unconstitutional a 
Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages below the eighth grade. 
The decision was based on the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of liberty, including "the 
right of the individual . . . to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children, to worship God . . . , and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized a t  common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 
Id. at 399. Similarly, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), invalidated an 
Oregon law that required all children to attend public schools. 
11. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). Similar language is used in 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400, 403 (1923). Both of these decisions have escaped 
much of the artillery aimed at the Lochner approach. 
12. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
13. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); G. GUNTHER, supra note 5, a t  591-92; McCloskey, 
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. 
CT. REV. 34. 
14. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). 
15. Id. at 488. 
16. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
17. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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succeeded in finding that economic regulation had at  least a min- 
imally rational relation to some legitimate state purpose.lR 
2. The new substantive due process 
In the realm of "personal" rights, substantive due process 
faded with the passing of the Lochner eralQnd was seldom 
invoked20 until its spectacular regeneration in Griswold v. Con- 
n e ~ t i c u t . ~ ~  Griswold held that a law forbidding the use of contra- 
ceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon the "right of privacy" 
of an i n d i v i d ~ a l . ~ ~  Although Justice Douglas explicitly declined to 
adopt Lochner as a guide and based the decision on penumbras 
and emanations from the Bill of Rights,23 in light of language from 
Roe u. WadeU to the effect that the right of privacy is founded 
on the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action,"25 Griswold must realistically be 
viewed as resting most comfortably on a substantive due process 
f o u n d a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The Court in Griswold applied the "familiar 
principle . . . that a 'governmental purpose to control or prevent 
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be 
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby invade the area of protected  freedom^."'^^ 
The strictness of the Griswold standard became fully appar- 
ent when the Court announced its decision in Roe v. Wade eight 
18. G. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 591; McCloskey, supra note 13, a t  34. 
19. G. GUNTHER, supra note 5, a t  619. 
20. The substantive due process methodology can be detected in Skinner v. Okla- 
homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (law requiring sterilization of larceners and 
certain other habitual criminals held unconstitutional, although technically on equal 
protection grounds) and in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (holding 
that denial of passports to members of Communist organizations violates due process). 
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
22. Id. a t  485. 
23. Id. at 482-85. 
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
25. Id. a t  153. 
26. Dixon, supra note 4, a t  83-84; Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 
1410, 1427 (1974). 
27. 381 U.S. a t  485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 
(1964)). Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Brennan, emphasized the extent of protection afforded "fundamental liberties" 
with notions and language borrowed from equal protection cases: 
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State 
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling," 
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,524. The law must be shown "necessary, and 
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state 
policy." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196. 
381 U.S. a t  497. 
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years later. Roe held that the "right of personal privacy includes 
the abortion decision,"28 that only "fundamental" rights are in- 
cluded in the right of personal privacy,2g that regulation limiting 
fundamental rights "may be justified only by a 'compelling state 
interest,' . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests a t  stake."30 
Borrowing the compelling state interest test from equal protec- 
tion cases, where its invocation has uniformly resulted in the 
invalidation of legi~lation,~' results in scrutiny of abortion legisla- 
tion on a much stricter level than the old substantive due process 
standards of reasonableness and minimum rationality would 
have required." Roe and its companion case, Doe v .  Bolton," 
resulted in the substantial invalidation of the criminal abortion 
laws of nearly every state? 
B. Constitutional Attacks on Reporting and Recordkeeping 
Provisions of the New Abortion Statutes 
In the wake of Roe and Doe, state legislatures drafted new 
laws governing abortions. Widespread attacks on these new abor- 
tion statutes included constitutional challenges of reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements prescribed by some of them. The 
court decisions in these cases are almost evenly divided-some 
upholding the provisions, others striking them down. 
1. Authority upholding reporting and recordkeeping provisions 
Probably the most determined assault on a reporting provi- 
28. Id. at  154. 
29. Id. at 152. 
30. Id. at  155. 
31. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc- 
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAW. L. REV. 1,8- 
9 (1972); Lee, Mr. Herbert Spencer and the Bachelor Stockbroker: Kramer u. Union Free 
School District No. 15, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 465 (1973). As Chief Justice Burger has 
pointed out: 
Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "compelling state 
interest" standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law 
has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever 
will, for it demands nothing less than perfection. 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (dissenting opinion). 
32. G.  GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 637-38; Ely, supra note 4, at  935. 
33. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
34. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139-40 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 181- 
82 (1973). For a classification and discussion of abortion laws as of 1972, see Comment, A 
Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradictions and the 
Problems, 1972 U .  ILL. L.F. 177. 
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sion to date was that brought in Schulman u. New York City 
Health and Hospitals C ~ r p . , ~ ~  in which New York's highest court 
held that a regulation requiring reporting of names and addresses 
of abortion patientss6 was "rationally related and narrowly tai- 
lored to the compelling State interest in maternal health."37 Obe- 
diently applying the compelling state interest test prescribed by 
Roe u. Wade,38 the court struggled to rationalize its conclusion in 
the face of vigorous dissents by three of the seven justices.39 In 
attempting to demonstrate that the name reporting requirement 
was rationally related and narrowly tailored to the compelling 
state interest in maternal health, the majority devoted much of 
its opinion to a discussion of the general benefits of abortion 
reporting, most of which, as the dissenters pointed out, could 
probably be accomplished equally well without reporting of 
names. The court relied heavily on the absence of direct proof 
tha t  the name requirement dissuaded women from procuring 
abortions,40 while the dissent insisted that the "chilling effect" of 
name reporting on the right to an abortion was patently evident.41 
The majority's only attempt to reconcile first trimester abortion 
reporting with Roe's ban of first trimester regulation was an ob- 
servation that reporting enables health officials "to determine 
whether second trimester abortions are being falsely reported as 
first trimester  abortion^."^^ The dissenting justices protested that 
such reasoning "obliterates completely the careful distinctions 
between the two trimesters drawn by the Supreme 
Applying the "less restrictive alternative" requirementd4 of the 
35. 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342 N.E.2d 501, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975), a f f  'g 44 App. Div. 2d 
482, 355 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1974). 
36. The New York City Board of Health prescribed the form and content of the 
pregnancy termination certificate pursuant to N.Y. CITY HEALTH CODE $ 4  204.03, .05. 
37. 38 N.Y.2d at  245,342 N.E.2d a t  507,379 N.Y.S.2d a t  710. The court emphasized 
the importance of N.Y. CITY HEALTH CODE § 204.07 protecting the confidentiality of such 
records. 38 N.Y .2d a t  237,240,244,342 N.E.2d at  502,504,507,379 N.Y .S.2d a t  703,706, 
710. For further discussion of confidentiality requirements, see notes 116-127 and accom- 
panying text infra. 
38. Notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra. 
39. 38 N.Y.2d a t  245-57,342 N.E.2d a t  507-15,379 N.Y.S.2d a t  710-21. The majority's 
difficulty in rationalizing its holding is largely attributable to the use of the compelling 
state interest test with its strong "presumption" of unconstitutionality. If the court had 
been free to apply a standard of reasonableness with a neutral weighing of interests, i t  
could have reached the same result with relative ease. See notes 99-106 and accompanying 
text infra. 
40. 38 N.Y.2d a t  240, 342 N.E.2d a t  504, 379 N.Y.S.2d a t  706. 
41. Id. at  253-54, 342 N.E.2d a t  513-14, 379 N.Y.S.2d a t  718-19. 
42. Id. a t  239, 342 N.E.2d at  503, N.Y.S.2d at  705. 
43. Id. a t  253, 342 N.E.2d a t  513, N.Y .S.2d a t  718. 
44. This requirement is discussed a t  notes 74-80 and accompanying text infra. 
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compelling state interest test, the dissent concocted a scheme for 
compiling abortion data according to coded numbers instead of 
patients' names, yet the plan included a means of identifying 
patients by name.45 The net result of such a plan is needless 
complication with no real increase in protection of privacy. Other 
courts that have upheld similar reporting provisions have appar- 
ently been able to do so with much less difficulty than that expe- 
rienced by the New York court.48 
2. Authority holding reporting and recordkeeping laws uncon- 
stitutional 
A decision representative of those that have invalidated re- 
porting and recordkeeping requirements is Hodgson v. 
Anderson," which held that extensive abortion regulations (in- 
cluding recording and reporting rules) issued by the Minnesota 
State Board of Health48 were uncon~titutional.~~ The major rea- 
sons for the court's conclusion were the statute's failure to ex- 
45. 38 N.Y.2d at  247,342 N.E.2d at  509, N.Y.S.2d at  712. 
46. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2846-47, aff'g 392 F. Supp. 
1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 184, 201, 204 (1973); Planned Parent- 
hood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1374 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976); 
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (upholding 
the portion of a provision that required reporting of an abortion patient's name, address, 
age, and date of abortion while striking down portions that required reporting of the 
spouse's name and address, names of parents of unmarried minor abortion patients, and 
facts showing the necessity of abortion); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 
1974), reu'd on other grounds, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding a statute requiring 
reporting of abortions performed after the first trimester, but ruling that reporting of the 
patient's street address was impermissible). In none of these cases was there a dissent from 
the holding that reporting requirements passed constitutional muster. 
47. 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed for want of juris. sub nom. 
Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975), reu'd in part per curium sub nom. Hodgson v. 
Lawson, No. 74-1569 (8th Cir., Oct. 6, 1976) (recordkeeping requirements directed to 
preservation of maternal health that respect patients' privacy are permissible regardless 
of stage of pregnancy). Other decisions that have invalidated reporting laws include 
Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975) (entire body of regulations struck down for failure to 
exclude first trimester of pregnancy from regulation); Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th 
Cir. 1974) (entire act invalidated for failure to exclude first trimester from regulation and 
lack of legitimate relationship to state interests); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (striking down entirely the reporting provisions upheld in Planned Par- 
enthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. 
Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973) (entire abortion statute held unconstitutional although two of 
the three judges regarded the reporting provisions as constitutional). 
48. The text of the regulations appears in 378 F. Supp. a t  1020-28. The regulations 
were issued by the Minnesota State Board of Health pursuant to MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 
145.413(1) (West Supp. 1976). 
49. 378 F. Supp. a t  1018. 
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clude first trimester abortions from regulation, the unnecessary 
extra layer of complex regulation not reasonably related to mater- 
nal health, and the singling out of abortion for special regulation 
that tended to chill the abortion decision.50 It is important to 
note, however, that although Hodgson invalidated the regulations 
issued pursuant to the Minnesota statute,51 the statute itself, 
which authorized the board of health to promulgate appropriate 
regulations to effect a system for reporting abortions, was left 
largely intact .52 
In the instant case, appellants argued that Missouri's report- 
ing and recordkeeping provisions were unconstitutional because 
they imposed an extra layer and burden of regulation on abor- 
tions and because they applied throughout all stages of preg- 
nancy. The Court responded to the first objection by conceding 
that there may be "conflicting interests affected by recordkeeping 
requirements," but it concluded that "[rlecordkeeping and re- 
porting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preser- 
vation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's 
confidentiality and privacy are perrnis~ible."~~ In addition, al- 
though the Court stated that it could "see no legally significant 
impact or consequence on the abortion decision or on the 
physician-patient relati~nship,"~~ it warned against abusive or 
excessive use of recordkeeping "in such a way as to accomplish, 
through the sheer burden of recordkeeping detail, what we have 
held to be an otherwise unconstitutional re~triction."~~ 
The second objection to the recordkeeping provisions, that 
they applied throughout all stages of pregnancy, was dismissed 
with little explanation. Appellants argued that the state, in the 
first trimester of pregnancy, cannot impose any recordkeeping 
requirements that differ significantly from those imposed on com- 
parable medical procedures. The Court's cursory response to this 
argument was that the recordkeeping provisions, "while perhaps 
50. Id. 
51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.413(1) (West Supp. 1976). 
52. 378 F. Supp. at 1012, 1016, 1018. 
53. Since this case note is confined to the topic of abortion reporting requirements, 
this section will discuss only the small portion of the Court's opinion that dealt with such 
requirements. The bulk of the opinion was devoted to more controversial issues such as 
spousal and parental consent. 
54. 96 S. Ct. at 2846. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 2846-47. 
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approaching permissible limits, are not constitutionally offensive 
in them~elves."~' In support of this conclusion, the Court ob- 
served that recordkeeping could be useful in protecting health 
and "may be a resource that is relevant to decisions involving 
medical experience and judgment."58 It further pointed out that 
recordkeeping had no apparent significant impact on the abortion 
decision and that Missouri physicians were also required to par- 
ticipate in reporting births, deaths, communicable diseases, and 
use of controlled  substance^.^^ 
The selection of a standard to apply in constitutional adjudi- 
cation is a crucial choice-one that often decides the ultimate 
issues before the standard is brought to bear upon the facts of a 
particular case.60 In order to evaluate the soundness of the deci- 
sion in the instant case, it is first necessary to analyze the alterna- 
tive standards in an attempt to arrive at a conclusion as to which 
standard is most appropriate in this and similar cases involving 
substantive due process. 
A. Compelling State Interest Test 
The Supreme Court has declared that the right of privacy is 
a "fundamental right,"" that the right of privacy includes the 
right to an abortion,62 and that a regulation limiting fundamental 
rights can be justified only by a compelling state interest." Thus, 
in the instant case, the Court could have opted to apply the strict 
compelling state interest test. The use of this strict approach, 
however, shifts the initial focus of judicial scrutiny away from the 
reasonableness of legislation and places it on the individual right 
involved, to determine whether it is a fundamental right, i.e., a 
right deserving of special p ro tec t i~n .~~ This determination is in- 
herently arbitrary and subjective since the Court has failed to 
prescribe any useful criteria for deciding which rights are funda- 
57. Id. at 2846. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 2846 & n.13. 
60. See note 31 and accompanying text supra. 
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
152 (1973). 
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
63. Id. at 155. 
64. Lee, supra note 31, at 465. 
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mental.65 Moreover, some fundamental rights are apparently 
more fundamental than others? The technique of classifying 
some rights as fundamental is further confused by the fact that 
a given right may be characterized in different ways or regarded 
as being derived from different sources. A right that is fundamen- 
tal under one characterization may not be fundamental under a 
different characterization. For instance, the plaintiffs in 
Schulman challenged abortion reporting requirements under 
three theories: (1) that the reporting of names of abortion patients 
infringes the right to an abortion, (2) that it violates the right to 
privacy connected with the use of one's name, and (3) that it 
violates the physician-patient privilege." These theories may be 
regarded as different characterizations of the same body of rights. 
While the first characterization is regarded as a fundamental 
right, the others are not likely to be so regarded by the courts. 
Once the right in question is classified as fundamental, the 
state can justify its infringement only by showing a compelling 
state interest. Thus, another semantic imponderable arises: Is the 
interest that the state has asserted to justify the challenged 
regulation a compelling interest or merely a legitimate one? Roe 
u. Wade announced that maternal health is a compelling interest, 
but only after the first trimester of pregnancy." It also announced 
that a state's interest in preserving fetal life is not compelling 
until the fetus becomes "viable" at approximately 24-28 weeks of 
65. Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 479, 
505-06 (1973). Goodpaster concludes that only four classes of rights are fundamental: first 
amendment rights, political participation rights, and rights to due process and equal 
protection. He excludes, however, the right of privacy and the right to travel, both pro- 
nounced fundamental by the Supreme Court. Id. a t  428-83. 
66. Although first amendment rights are regarded as fundamental, Roe gave the 
"right to abortion" more rigorous protection than the First Amendment receives. See 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("[aldvertising, like all public expression, 
may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest"); Wolff 
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (holding that a prison regulation requiring that mail 
from attorneys to inmates be opened by prison officials in the presence of the inmates did 
not violate the constitutional rights of prisoners); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104, 115 (1972) (discussing the right to use a public place for expressive activity, the Court 
said, "[olur cases make equally clear, however, that reasonable 'time, place and manner' 
regulations may be necessary to further significant governmental interests, and are 
permitted"); Ely, supra note 4, at  935. 
67. 38 N.Y.2d a t  237 & n.1, 342 N.E.2d at 502 & n.1, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 703 & n.1. 
68. 410 U.S. at 163. This conclusion was explicitly based on medical data tending to 
show that mortality in abortion during the fiist trimester "may be less than mortality in 
normal childbirth." Id. The possibility thus remains that the state could regulate first 
trimester abortions under certain circumstances if they were shown to be more dangerous 
than normal childbirth. 
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pregnancy? The Court in Roe sought to balance the public inter- 
ests of maternal health and fetal life against the private interests 
of autonomy and privacy, but the Court kept a heavy thumb on 
the private side of the scales by invoking the compelling state 
interest test with its virtual presumption of uncon~titutionality.~~ 
If the state's interest in limiting a fundamental right is 
deemed compelling, then the state must show an appropriate 
relationship between the questioned regulation and the compel- 
ling interest. Some commentators and courts have insisted that 
to satisfy the required relationship the regulations limiting the 
right to abortion must be necessary to the achievement of a com- 
pelling state interest," but this formulation of the test may be 
overly strict. Roe v. Wade required only that, after the first stage 
of pregnancy, regulations limiting the right to abortion must be 
reasonably related (rather than necessary) to a compelling state 
interest, such as maternal health.7z The apparent difference be- 
tween these two formulations of the test may not be as great as 
it first appears, however, since Roe added that "legislative enact- 
ments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate 
state interests a t  stake."73 
The additional qualification that abortion legislation must 
be narrowly tailored to legitimate interests is generally included 
in the verbal baggage of the compelling state interest test7j in one 
or more of its variations, including "~verbreadth ,"~~ "less (or 
least) drastic means,"76 "less restrictive alternative, "77 "precision 
-- 
69. 410 U.S. a t  160, 163. 
70. Notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra. 
71. E.g., Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 250, 
342 N.E.2d 501, 511, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 715 (1975) (dissenting opinion); Comment, In 
Defense of Liberty: A Look at the Abortion Decisions, 61 GEO. L.J. 1559,1569 (1973); Note, 
Roe and Paris: Does fiivacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1166-67, 1172-73 
(1974). As used in these sources, "necessary" is synonymous with "indispensable." 
72. 410 U.S. a t  164. Doe v.  Bolton also required the relationship to be reasonable 
rather than necessary. 410 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1973). 
73. 410 U.S. a t  155. Establishing that the two formulations are in fact identical 
appears to be as hopeless as answering a philosopher's riddle. 
74. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716-18 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
75. E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973); United States v. Robel, 389 U S .  
258, 262, 265-66 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508, 514 (1964). 
76. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 
479, 488 (1960). For a discussion of this concept, see Note, Less Drastic Means and the 
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969) (concluding that the doctrine is not a useful 
tool). 
77. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716-18 (1974). For exhaustive discussion 
of this principle, see Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic 
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of regu la t i~n , "~~  and "nece~sity."~~ Although these variations are 
intended to articulate a requirement of precision of regulation, 
the requirement is far from precise in both theory and practice. 
Its primary usefulness is in emphasizing the strictness with which 
the Court scrutinizes a particular law.80 
As one constitutional law scholar observed in commenting on 
the compelling state interest language of Roe v. Wade, 
All of this terminology may be no more than an elaborate 
way of saying that the validity of a statute burdening the inter- 
est in privacy is determined by weighing the extent of the bur- 
den against the importance of the state interests. If so, the lan- 
guage changes nothing. It may, however, suggest a more me- 
chanical approach: if the interest in privacy is burdened, 
whether substantially or not, the regulation must be necessary 
to achieve a compelling state interest. Such an interpretation 
would tend to extend to the interest in privacy a measure of 
protection greater than that normally accorded other constitu- 
tionally protected  interest^.^' 
Despite the Supreme Court's concern for the weighing and bal- 
ancing of competing interests,82 the Court's use of such absolutist 
language as "fundamental right," "compelling state interest," 
and "narrowly drawn" has led many lower courts into the error 
of mechanically granting the right to abortion and the right of 
"privacy" an inordinate and undeserved protection that exceeds 
the protection granted to such long-standing rights as those guar- 
anteed by the First Amendment.83 Even the Supreme Court has 
Due Process, 80 HAW. L. REV. 1463 (1967); Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in 
Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. 
L. REV. 971 (1974). 
78. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
79. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
80. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (using the terms "necessary," 
"precision," "tailored," and "less drastic means" as makeweights to justify extremely 
strict scrutiny in that case). 
81. Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role 
for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 121. 
82. Notes 99-108 and accompanying text infra. This concern for balancing can also 
be detected in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
83. Note 66 supra. In Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974), a St. Louis 
ordinance regulating abortion clinics was struck down in its entirety because the court was 
not persuaded that it was "necessary to protect either the state's interest in maternal 
health or future life" and because i t  failed to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy from 
regulation. Id. at 1351. In Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 
F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975), Chicago health regulations 
governing abortions were declared invalid for the same reasons. The court conceded that 
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often been guilty of using the compelling state interest standard 
in a rigid, mechanical way in equal protection cases.84 In view of 
its tendency to obfuscate important issues and to mechanically 
overprotect abortion and other rights, the compelling state inter- 
est test and most of its verbal baggages should be discarded, a t  
least in the abortion context.86 
B. Minimum Rationality 
The toothless minimum rationality test applied in Nebbia v. 
New Yorkg7 and subsequent economic due process cases purports 
to require that legislation be rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest? Although this test contains the same language 
used frequently to strike down legislation during the Lochner 
period, it has come to represent 'a virtual abdication of judicial 
scrutiny by indiscriminately upholding legislation of dubious va- 
lid it^.^^ I t  is highly unlikely that the Court, in the near future, will 
apply the minimum rationality test to abortion legislation since 
that test represents the polar opposite of the compelling state 
the regulations might be upheld under the traditional "rational relationship" standard, 
but it mechanically invoked the fatal compelling state interest test. Id. at  1150. Another 
instance of the mechanical approach is Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Pa. 
1975), in which all the challenged provisions of Pennsylvania's abortion statute were 
declared unconstitutional. Lower courts have overprotected abortion in the sense that they 
have frequently invalidated laws similar to those sustained in the instant case. See, e.g., 
notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra. 
84. Note 31 and accompanying text supra. 
85. Notes 61-80 and accompanying text supra. 
86. In commenting on Roe u. Wade, one scholar observed: 
Even in cases that do not give rise to the devilish questions of what counts as a 
person, the term "compelling state interest" is an analytical snare of no modest 
proportions. But here . . . the phrase is but a plaything of the judges, an excuse 
but never a reason for a decision. 
Epstein, supm note 4, a t  184-85. See Goodpaster, supra note 65, at  483,513-14 (advocating 
a reasonableness-balancing standard for most rights, including privacy); Perry, supra note 
4, at 733 n.203 (concluding that the compelling state interest test had no place in resolu- 
tion of the fundamental issue in Roe u. Wade of whether abortion regulation intruded on 
a matter outside the scope of public morals). 
Although it is hazardous to prognosticate, it appears that the Court's approach in 
Danforth, notes 99-108 infra, coupled with the marked absence of compelling interest 
language in that opinion and the Court's recent showing of distaste for strict scrutiny in 
equal protection and First Amendment cases, suggests that the Court is scuttling the 
compelling state interest test. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (declining to 
apply the overbreadth test and applying a reasonableness test in a first amendment case), 
noted in 61 CORNELL . REV. 640 (1976); G. GUNTHER, supra note 5, a t  839-88; Gunther, 
supra note 31, a t  17-21, 37-38. 
87. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
88. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra. 
89. See notes 9-18 and accompanying text supra. 
990 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
interest test of Roe v. Wade.go Minimum rationality, however, 
merits discussion because of the possibility, however remote, that 
some courts may read the instant case as applying a minimum 
rationality standard. 
In the instant case, the Court obviously employed a much 
stricter degree of scrutiny than that which the minimum rational- 
ity test entails, since the Court held most of the challenged Mis- 
souri provisions uncon~titutional.~~ Under the minimum rational- 
ity approach, the Court could have upheld all the provisions chal- 
lenged by demonstrating that "there [was] an evil at  hand for 
correction, and that  it might be thought tha t  the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."92 
Minimum rationality would not be a desirable standard for 
review of abortion legislation because it suffers from the same 
kinds of defects that plague the compelling interest standard.93 I t  
has degenerated into a mechanical approach that announces, 
rather than explains, the result; it makes a proper balancing of 
interests impossible by overloading one side of the scales;" and 
it ignores important factors such as the degree of infringement of 
private rights and the importance (or unimportance) of the 
state's interest in regulation. Because of these defects, minimum 
rationality and the compelling state interest test should, and pos- 
sibly will, be abandoned. Although these tests may be valid as 
extreme endpoints of a general standard of reasonablene~s,~~ they 
are superfluous because the general standard encompasses them. 
Their tendency to become crystallized as general standards in 
many contexts and the misleading effect of the compelling state 
interest test on lower courts support the view that they should be 
discarded. The recent development of the "newer" equal protec- 
90. In the context of equal protection, however, the Supreme Court has recently 
breathed new life and meaning into the rationality test. In its rejuvenated form, it is a 
neutral standard involving genuine scrutiny that commonly includes a balancing of inter- 
ests. Gunther, supra note 31, at 17-21. This modem standard, as applied in the context 
of substantive due process, will be discussed in text accompanying notes 99-129 infra. 
91. Notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra. 
92. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
93. Notes 65-66, 81-86 and accompanying text supra. 
94. Notes 13-18 and accompanying text supra. 
95. One constitutional law scholar reasoned: 
[Bloth the "rational" basis standard and the strict scrutiny standard of due 
process and equal protection review are wrong as general standards. They de- 
scribe instead specific instances of application of a general standard, reason- 
ableness review. They are the respective end points of the continua of due 
process and equal protection review. 
Goodpaster, supra note 65, at 513-14. 
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tion's rationality standard lends credence to the suggestion that 
the Court may abandon both the minimum rationality and the 
compelling state interest tests in other contexts as well.96 
C .  Reasonableness Standard with Balancing of Interests 
The appropriate standard for reviewing abortion legislation 
(and other legislation within the purview of substantive due pro- 
cess) is necessarily a vague one since attempts to formulate more 
precise standards seem largely counterprod~ctive.~~ A standard of 
reasonableness, although vague, has served long and faithfully in 
American jurisprudence in numerous contexts. The reasonable- 
ness standard in constitutional adjudication requires that legisla- 
tive ends and means be fair and reasonable as seen in the light 
of a neutral weighing and balancing of the interests of the state 
against the interests of persons whose rights are jeopardized by 
the legislation in question.gs 
In the instant case, the Supreme Court appears to have ap- 
plied such a reasonableness standard in arriving at its determina- 
tion that Missouri's statutory provisions for the reporting of abor- 
tions were constitutionally valid? In reaching its conclusion that 
"[rlecordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reason- 
ably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that 
properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are per- 
missible,"loO the Court sought to weigh the interests of the abor- 
tion patient against the interests of the state. Relevant interests 
of the patient include the qualified right to an abortion without 
undue regulation,lO' the right of privacy regarding information 
about oneself,'02 and the freedom from interference in the 
96. The newer equal protection's rationality standard bears a superficial resem- 
blance to minimum rationality in that it uses the same "rational relation" language, but 
the Court has recently used the rationality standard in numerous cases to invalidate 
legislation that would have easily survived minimum rationality scrutiny. In those cases, 
the Court carefully avoided the use of compelling state interest language and genuinely 
scrutinized the challenged legislation to ensure that it was indeed rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest. Note 90 supra. 
97. Notes 61-86 and accompanying text supra. 
98. See Goodpaster, supra note 65, a t  512-15. 
99. The Court did not explicitly announce the standard it chose to apply, but its 
language is much more suggestive of a neutral reasonableness standard with balancing of 
interests than of a compelling state interest approach that requires the state to select the 
least restrictive alternative. 
100. 96 S. Ct. a t  2846. 
101. Id. a t  2837. 
102. Although the Court never explicitly mentioned this "right" in the Danforth 
opinion, the Court's emphasis on respect for a patient's "confidentiality and privacy," 
id. a t  2846, reveals that this right was being protected. 
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physician-patient relationship.lo3 Relevant state interests include 
preserving maternal health and life and monitoring abortions to 
ensure that they are performed in conformity with the law.lo4 
After considering these competing interests, the Court con- 
cluded that the balance struck by the Missouri law was accept- 
able and reasonable. As to private interests, the Court said that 
as long as useful recordkeeping is not abused or overdone and 
privacy and confidentiality are protected, abortion recordkeeping 
has "no legally significant impact or consequence on the abortion 
decision or on the physician-patient relationship,"lo5 and privacy 
of information is likewise uninfringed. As to state interests, the 
Court chose not to speak in terms of absolutes, but deferred to 
the legislature's judgment that the law was reasonable by observ- 
ing that "maintenance of records indeed may be helpful in devel- 
oping information pertinent to the preservation of maternal 
health."lo6 
Further evidence of the reasonableness-balancing standard 
can be found in portions of the opinion that dealt with other 
provisions of Missouri's abortion statute. First, with respect to 
the issue of spousal consent, the Court weighed paternal rights 
against the mother's rights and concluded that "[slince it is the 
woman who physically bears the child and who is the more di- 
rectly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the 
two, the balance weighs in her favor."lo7 Second, in resolving the 
parental consent issue, the Court weighed the interests of the 
state, the minor, and her parents and decided that "[alny inde- 
- - 
103. Id. at 2846. 
104. Id. The Court noted that the latter interest (which is largely dependent upon 
the existence of other interests, especially the interests in maternal health and fetal life) 
"fades somewhat into insignificance in view of our holding above as to spousal and paren- 
tal consent requirements." Id. In other words, the state could no longer require execution 
of spousal and parental consent forms. The state's interest in monitoring abortions, how- 
ever, retains significance in view of provisions requiring the patient's written consent, Mo. 
ANN. STAT. § 188.020(2) (Vernon Supp. 1976)' requiring the physician's certification that 
the fetus was not viable, id. § 188.030, and requiring the patient's certification that she 
has been informed that her parental rights may be in jeopardy if the fetus survives, id. 
9§ 188.040, .045. The Court's implicit recognition of the state's interest in monitoring 
abortions may be significant in that it tends to discredit the common assumption that 
the state can regulate abortions in the second trimester only in ways reasonably related 
to maternal health. Rw u. Wade did not say that maternal health was the only state 
interest worthy of recognition. See 410 U.S. a t  162-64. 
105. 96 S. Gt. at 2846. 
106. Id. In the next paragraph the Court added that "[rlecordkeeping of this kind 
. . . can be useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, 
and may be a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and 
judgment." Id. (emphasis added). 
107. 96 S. Ct. a t  2842. 
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pendent interest the parent may have in the termination of the 
minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of 
privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become 
pregnant. "'OR 
While many may disagree with the relative weight the Court 
assigned to the competing interests, it is significant that a balanc- 
ing approach was utilized rather than a narrow, mechanical ap- 
plication of compelling state interest jargon. It is also significant 
that the Court's holding as to the spousal and parental consent 
provisions applies only to the first twelve weeks of pregnancytog 
and that the Court left room for a parental veto, given sufficient 
justification, even in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.lto The 
significance of these facets of the instant case lies in the fact that 
the Court has not foreclosed the possibility that a different bal- 
ance may be struck in subsequent stages of pregnancy, under 
different statutory schemes, or when medical knowledge has 
added greater insight into abortion issues. 
By using a reasonableness-balancing approach, the Court 
was able to reach a sound conclusion as to the validity of the 
reporting provision of Missouri's abortion statute. Unhampered 
by the compelling state interest test and its distorting influ- 
ence,''' the Court recognized that the reporting law struck a rea- 
sonable balance between the state's interest in maternal health 
and the patient's interest in privacy and autonomy. Although the 
Court did not expound on the relationship between reporting 
abortion information and preserving the health of pregnant 
women, the possible dangers and deleterious consequences of 
abortions, including cervical scarring, subsequent miscarriages 
and premature births, sterility, menstrual complications and 
neurosis,112 amply justified the Missouri legislature in prescribing 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements in order to develop 
data relevant to maternal health. This data may prove extremely 
valuable as a means of enhancing physicians' medical judgment 
and enabling patients to approach the abortion decision with 
greater awareness of its consequences. Indeed, it would be absurd 
-- 
108. Id. at 2844. The Court has apparently failed to distinguish between physical and 
emotional maturity. Justice Blackmun surely does not believe that pregnancy is proof of 
one's emotional maturity. 
109. Id. at 2841-44. 
110. Id. at 2844. 
111. See Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342 
N.E.2d 501, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975); notes 38-46 and accompanying text supra. 
112. See O'Meara, Abortion: The Court Decides a Non-Case, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 
346-47; Comment, The Case of Abortion, 52 J. URB. L. 277, 335 (1974). 
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to deny states the opportunity to collect medical data concerning 
abortion, a medical procedure that involves serious dangers and 
permanent aftereffects, some of which are probably yet unknown. 
Abortion reporting provisions seem especially reasonable in view 
of the fact that state laws commonly require the reporting of 
certain communicable diseases to aid in protecting public health, 
even though such reporting tends to invade personal privacy.l13 
While the state's interest in maternal health lends vital sup- 
port to the constitutionality of abortion reporting requirements, 
proper analysis requires equal consideration of the rights of 
women who elect to undergo an abortion. The typical objection 
to abortion recording and reporting regulations is that they tend 
collaterally to deter the exercise of the right to an abortion by 
exposing the abortion patient to the threat that her abortion may 
become public knowledge.l14 Despite the subjective nature of this 
argument, there can be little doubt that a t  least a few women 
would hesitate to procure an abortion, would use a false name, 
would seek an illegal abortion, or would even forego an abortion 
entirely because of their reluctance to risk public exposure. In the 
instant case, the Court obviously weighed this concern in the 
balance, as evidenced by the Court's emphasis on the protection 
of the patient's confidentiality and privacy.l15 Second-guessing 
the Supreme Court is a difficult and risky enterprise, but it ap- 
pears that the confidentiality provision of the Missouri abortion 
law116 was a crucial factor.l17 
A close examination of the fate of similar reporting provisions 
in other courts supports the thesis that confidentiality provisions 
are essential to the validity of reporting requirements. In every 
113. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 8 19-89 (West 1969) (requiring physicians to report 
cases of cholera, yellow fever, typhus fever, leprosy, smallpox, diphtheria, typhoid fever, 
scarlet fever, syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, and other communicable diseases). 
114. See Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 
255-56, 342 N.E.2d 501, 504, 513-14, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702, 706, 718-19 (1975); Note, 
Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 
COLUM. L. REV. 237, 247-48, 251 (1974). 
115. 96 S. Ct. at 2846. 
116. Mo. ANN. STAT. $ 188.055(3) (Vernon Supp. 1976) provides in pertinent part: 
All information obtained by physician, hospital, clinic or other health facil- 
ity from a patient for the purpose of preparing reports to the division of health 
under this section or reports received by the division of health shall be confiden- 
tial and shall be used only for statistical purposes. Such records, however, may 
be inspected and health data acquired by  local, state, or national public health 
officers. 
The st.atute also provides that breach of confidentiality is a misdemeanor. Id. § 188.070. 
117. See 96 S. Ct. a t  2846. 
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instance in which reporting requirements were upheld, the chal- 
lenged regulations included a provision protecting the confiden- 
tiality of abortion patients.l18 Of decisions that invalidated re- 
porting requirements, about half involved regulations that failed 
to provide for confidentiality;llg the other half were typically deci- 
sions that held abortion statutes or ordinances unconstitutional 
as a whole, without individual consideration of reporting require- 
ments.120 
A difficult question of degree might arise if an abortion pa- 
tient should insist that a particular confidentiality provision fails 
to adequately protect confidentiality, either because the provi- 
sion does not sufficiently restrict access to the patient's records 
or because the provision is frequently ignored in practice.121 The 
balancing approach, however, has sufficient flexibility to accom- 
modate this objection and allow it to be properly weighed in light 
of the facts of the particular case. 
Unlike the regulations in the instant case, some abortion 
reporting laws do not require the patient's name and address to 
be re~0rded . l~~  Such regulatory schemes clearly avoid the problem 
of confidentiality, but it appears that the constitutional "right 
118. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (implicitly sustaining a Georgia regulation 
requiring reporting of abortions and providing for confidentiality); Planned Parenthood 
Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (upholding a portion of a provision 
that required reporting of patient's name, address, age, and date of abortion and that 
protected confidentiality); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), rev'd 
on other grounds, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding a reporting statute that did not 
require reporting of names and ordering that patient's street address not be reported); 
Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342 N.E.2d 501, 379 
N.Y.S.2d 702 (1975) (sustaining regulations requiring reporting of patient's name and 
address and providing for confidentiality). 
119. Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974) (invalidating entire abortion 
ordinance that included name reporting requirement but did not provide for confidential- 
ity); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973) (striking down entire statute 
containing provision requiring extensive reporting without protecting confidentiality, but 
two of the three judges felt that the reporting provision was constitutional). 
120. Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. 
Pa. 1975) (slight individual consideration of reporting requirements); Hodgson v. Ander- 
son, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed for want of juris. sub nom. 
Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975), rev'd per curium sub nom. Hodgson v. Lawson, 
No. 74-1569 (8th Cir., Oct. 6, 1976). 
121. For discussion of practical difficulties in maintaining confidentiality of medical 
records, see Boyer, Computerized Medical Records and the Right to Privacy: The Emerg- 
ing Fedeml Response, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 37 (1975); Comment, Information Privacy: 
Constitutional Challenges to the Collection and Dissemination of Personal Information by 
Government Agencies, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 229 (1976). 
122. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (Supp. 1976), construed in Wolfe v. Schroering, 
388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-19 (Supp. 1976). 
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of privacy" does not require the state entirely to forego gathering 
any abortion information that might identify the patient. In 
Schulman, the court rejected the argument that reporting the 
patient's name and address violated the right of privacy.123 The 
dissenting justices, however, were convinced that the state's in- 
terest in gathering statistical data relevant to maternal health 
could be adequately recognized without reporting names and 
addresses 
In the instant case, the Court did not explicitly deal with the 
state's interest in obtaining names and addresses of abortion pa- 
tients, but it implicitly recognized such an interest in holding 
that reporting of abortions is permissible if the patient's confiden- 
tiality and privacy are ~r0 tec ted . l~~  Without the patient's name, 
the state would, as a practical matter, be unable to develop sta- 
tistical information concerning the medical consequences of re- 
peated abortions performed on the same woman.126 Since existing 
data suggest that repeated abortions threaten to impair the pa- 
tient's health,12' the state should have the opportunity to facili- 
tate collection of further information as to the effects of repeated 
abortions by requiring reporting of patients' names and addresses 
(in addition to medical information), as long as confidentiality is 
preserved. 
In summary, a reasonableness standard that includes a 
neutral weighing of interestslZ8 was probably the test employed 
by the Court to reach the sound conclusion that "[rlecord- 
keeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed 
to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect 
a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible."lB The 
Court apparently found Missouri's abortion reporting provisions 
reasonable and valid because the state's interest in gathering 
data relevant to maternal health outweighs the patient's interest 
in keeping information about her abortion completely off the 
record. 
123. 38 N.Y.2d at 240, 242-44, 342 N.E.2d at 504, 506-07, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 706, 708- 
09. 
124. Id. at 245-57, 342 N.E.2d at 508-15, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 710-21. 
125. 96 S. Ct. at 2846. 
126. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text supra. 
127. O'Meara, supra note 112, at 346-47. 
128. "Neutral" is used here to suggest a weighing of interests without the distorting 
influence of either the compelling state interest test, which overemphasizes the rights of 
the individual, or the minimum rationality approach, which affords individual rights 
almost no protection. 
129. 96 S. Ct. at 2846. 
CASE NOTES 
D. Reporting Allowed at All Stages of Pregnancy 
Perhaps the most unexpected aspect of the Court's holding 
with respect to abortion reporting requirements is the Court's 
approval of a statute requiring reporting a t  all stages of preg- 
nancy,'" despite strong language in Roe v. Wade proscribing any 
regulation of first trimester abortions.l3l A possible explanation 
for this result is that the impact on the patient of reporting is so 
insignificant (when confidentiality is protected) that reporting 
requirements cannot be said to limit or regulate abortion at  all.132 
However, such an explanation lacks cogency in light of the 
Court's concern for balancing interests and finding a reasonable 
relation to maternal health.133 If there were no possibility that 
reporting might significantly infringe the right to abortion, the 
Court would have had no occasion to justify reporting by invoking 
the state's interest in maternal health. 
Another possible, and more plausible, explanation for the 
Court's approval of first trimester reporting is that the Supreme 
Court, beleaguered by well-reasoned attacks on its ban of first 
trimester r eg~ la t ion , '~~  may be laying the foundation for a circum- 
spect retreat from the stance of Roe v. Wade. This view is sup- 
ported by the Court's holding that a provision requiring the pa- 
tient's written consent to her own abortion in the first twelve 
weeks of pregnancy is not uncon~t i tu t iona l .~~~  Regulation during 
the first stage of pregnancy, strangely, is consistent with the hold- 
ing of Doe v. Bolton (the companion case to Roe), which involved 
the challenge of a Georgia statute containing reporting provisions 
130. Id. 
131. In Roe the Court held that, in the first trimester of pregnancy, 
the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, 
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's 
pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may 
be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State. 
410 U.S. a t  163 (emphasis added). 
132. In Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), the Court said: 
Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may 
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . When it is shown that state action threatens significantly to impinge 
upon constitutionally protected freedom i t  becomes the duty of this Court to 
determine whether the action bears a reasonable relationship to the achieve- 
ment of the governmental purpose asserted as its justification. 
Id. a t  524-25 (emphasis added). 
133. 96 S. Ct. a t  2846. 
134. E.g., Ely, supra note 4, a t  942 n.117; Epstein, supra note 4, a t  181-83. 
135. 96 S. Ct. a t  2839-40. 
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similar to M i s s o ~ r i ' s . ~ ~ ~  Under Georgia's law, reporting was also 
required during the first stage of pregnancy,ls7 yet the Court in 
Doe did not invalidate the reporting provision.138 Since i t  seems 
unlikely that this discrepancy between Roe and Doe was due to 
oversight, it is possible that the Court felt that reporting was 
merely a procedural regulation governed by less stringent stan- 
dards than those applicable to substantive regulation of abor- 
t i o n ~ , ' ~ ~  or the Court may have overstated its point in Roe u. 
Wade. 140 
A more satisfactory justification for the seemingly contradic- 
tory judicial endorsement of reporting requirements for abortions 
performed in the first stage of pregnancy rests in part upon Roe 
u. Wade's holding that for the first stage of pregnancy, "the abor- 
tion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical 
judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."141 In the 
instant case, the Court observed that recordkeeping data "may 
be a resorce that is relevant to decisions involving medical experi- 
ence and judgment."142 These two statements in juxtaposition, 
coupled with an awareness of the dangers and serious medical 
consequences of abortions,143 offer a sound basis for permitting the 
state to collect data concerning abortions in order to enhance the 
attending physician's medical judgment, as well as to enable the 
pregnant woman to cope more intelligently with the abortion de- 
136. 410 U.S. at 181-84. 
137. See GA. CODE ANN. 9 26-1202(b)(7)-(9) (1972). The statute makes no exception 
for first trimester abortions. This statute was replaced in 1973 by one containing similar 
reporting provisions. Id. § 26-1202(d) (Supp. 1976). 
138. 410 U.S. a t  184, 201. 
139. In Roe v. Wade, 410 US.  113, 165 (1973), the Court made reference to its 
consideration of "procedural requirements" in Doe. One might infer that the Court re- 
garded Roe as dealing with laws that prohibit abortion (substantive regulation), while it 
regarded Doe as dealing with laws that impose certain conditions on the performing of 
abortions (procedural regulation). See Note, The Abortion Cases: A Return to Lochner, 
or a New Substantive Due Process?, 37 ALB. L. REV. 776,794-95 (1973). In the instant case, 
however, the Court said that, after the first stage of pregnancy, the state could adopt 
"substantive as well as recordkeeping regulations that are reasonable means of protecting 
maternal health." 96 S. Ct. a t  2846. This statement clearly does not fit such a substance- 
versus-procedure dichotomy because it  does not use the word "substantive" to denote a 
prohibition of abortion. Any kind of a substance-procedure dichotomy in abortion regula- 
tion would probably be extremely difficult to maintain with any integrity because the 
distinction is based more on semantics than rational analysis. Therefore, the distinction 
does not appear to be a sound basis for applying different constitutional standards to 
abortion regulations. 
140. see  note 131 and accompanying text supra. 
141. 410 US.  at 164. 
142. 96 S. Ct. a t  2846. 
143. See text accompanying notes 112-113 supra. 
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cision. With regard to first trimester regulation of abortion, the 
enormous advantage of a balancing technique over a mechanical 
jurisprudence is evident: the Court can weigh the relevant factors 
in the balance and reasonably and justifiably conclude that re- 
porting of first trimester abortions ought to be permitted. 
